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If God is entirely good (omnibenevolent) and all-powerful (omnipotent), why
is there evil in the world that he created? Whereas some thinkers resolve this
perceived dilemma by denying either God’s omnipotence or omnibenevolence,
many theologians who affirm both of these divine characteristics appeal to the
free-will defense. This perspective claims that, although God is entirely good
and possesses the power to exclude evil altogether, God allows evil because to
do otherwise would negate creaturely free will. However, theologians continue
to vigorously debate whether Scripture supports the freedom of humans to
will otherwise than they do. Whereas the indeterminist appeals to passages
that support the freedom of humans, the determinist responds by asserting
that human “freedom” is compatible with unilateral divine determination of
all events (compatibilism). With this impasse in mind, this essay addresses
the issue of whether Scripture actually supports free will by appealing to the
logically prior and theocentric question: Does God always get what he wants?
The Debate over Human Freedom in Scripture
Does Scripture support the freedom of humans? This heavily debated and
age-old question over the relationship between divine providence and human
freedom has eluded consensus throughout the ages of Christian theology.
Over time, the argument has become increasingly complex, with competing
conceptions of what “free will” means. The two most prominent conceptions
of human free will stem from the mutually exclusive conceptions of
determinism and indeterminism, which lie at the crux of this issue. Determinists
contend that God unilaterally and arbitrarily determines every occurrence
such that creatures cannot will otherwise than they do. Nevertheless, many
determinists contend that humans do indeed possess free will. In this view of
soft determinism, known as compatibilism, free will means that a creature is
not externally compelled but is nevertheless controlled by God’s unilaterally
efficacious will. In other words, the compatibilist contends that humans are
free to do what they want but what they want is itself unilaterally determined
by God.1 Indeterminists, on the other hand, believe that the human will is not
1
There are many varieties of compatibilism, and this description refers to what is
sometimes referred to as broad compatibilism—that is, the view that determinism is
compatible with free will and moral responsibility. Some compatibilists favor a narrow
compatibilism (e.g., semicompatibilism) wherein agents may be determined such that
they lack free will but nevertheless possess moral responsibility. On the various forms
and contemporary issues regarding compatibilism, see the essays in Robert Kane, ed.
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011),

195

196

Seminary Studies 52 (Autumn 2014)

(entirely) determined by divine or other causes. Accordingly, humans have the
freedom to choose otherwise than they do.2 That is, they possess libertarian
and significant freedom.3
The crux of the debate between compatibilists and libertarians, then,
depends on whether God unilaterally determines the outcome of all events.
Can creatures will otherwise than they do, as many libertarians affirm, or does
God arbitrarily and unilaterally determine all occurrences such that creatures
only do what God has eternally determined? For many scholars, the outcome
of this debate hinges upon Scriptural support. However, many determinists
and indeterminists claim biblical support for their positions while denying
that the opposite position does justice to the biblical data.4
153-242.
2
Some libertarians define human free will in a way that does not require the
freedom to do otherwise. On one such view (source incompatibilism), alternate
possibility is not required for freedom but merely “the absence of external causal
constraints determining one’s action.” William Lane Craig, “Response to Boyd,” in
Four Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
2011), 226. This view that alternate possibility is not a necessary condition of genuine
freedom accepts the upshot of Frankfurt-type examples that aim to demonstrate that
the ability to do otherwise is not a necessary condition of moral responsibility. Since
Harry Frankfurt’s seminal article (“Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility,”
Journal of Philosophy 66/23 [1969]: 829-839) such examples have been the subject of
ongoing debate. See the various positions explained in David Widerker and Michael
McKenna, eds., Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of
Alternative Possibilities (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2003); Robert Kane, ed. The Oxford
Handbook of Free Will, 243-308. I am among those not convinced that Frankfurt-type
examples successfully refute the principle of alternate possibility (PAP). See, for one
example of the philosophical defense of PAP, Carl Ginet, “In Defense of the Principle
of Alternative Possibilities: Why I Don’t Find Frankfurt’s Argument Convincing,”
in Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative
Possibilities, ed. David Widerker and Michael McKenna (Burlington, VT: Ashgate,
2003), 53-74. Nevertheless, the conclusion of this essay does not hinge upon the
PAP version of libertarian free will. A slightly more modest definition of creaturely
libertarian freedom is sufficient, flowing from the fact of divine unfulfilled desires
in Scripture, which suggest that creatures possess (at least) the freedom to choose
otherwise than God desires.
Significant freedom affirms, yet goes beyond, libertarian freedom by explicitly
framing human freedom as moral freedom. See Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1977), 30, 47; Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), 166-167.
4
I firmly agree with John Piper that this decision should be made only “on the
basis of what the Scriptures teach.” John Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” in
Still Sovereign: Contemporary Perspectives on Election, Foreknowledge, and Grace, ed. Thomas
R. Schreiner and Bruce A. Ware (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 2000), 130.
Cf. Piper’s expansion of this essay in his brief book, Does God Desire All to Be Saved?
(Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2013).
3
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The indeterminist who supports the significant freedom of humans
might appeal to numerous passages that explicitly describe human choice.
For example, in Deut 30:19, God proclaims, “I have set before you life and
death, the blessing and the curse. So choose life in order that you may live.”5
Likewise, Joshua stated, “choose for yourselves today whom you will serve”
whether YHWH or the false gods of Canaan (Josh 24:15; cf. 1 Kgs 18:21).
Accordingly, God proclaims judgment against his people because they “chose
[rxb] that in which” God “did not delight [#px]” (Is 65:12; cf. Ps 78:22).
Further, Scripture repeatedly points to the conditionality involved in the
God-human relationship. For instance, in Deut 11:26–28, God states, “I am
setting before you today a blessing and a curse: the blessing if you listen to
the commandments of the LORD your God . . . and the curse, if you do not
listen” (cf. 2 Chron 15:2; Jer 18:7-10). Likewise, in Rom 10:9, Paul states, “if
you confess with your mouth Jesus as Lord, and believe in your heart that
God raised Him from the dead, you will be saved” (cf. Acts 16:31; Heb 3:8,
12). Accordingly, Christ states, “I stand at the door and knock; if anyone
hears My voice and opens the door, I will come in to him and will dine with
him, and he with Me” (Rev 3:20; cf. John 1:12; 3:16-18; 8:31-32).
In my view, the verses above and many others do refer to the freedom
of human agents to will otherwise than they do. However, the compatibilist
responds to these passages by claiming that human freedom does not exclude
determinism, and does so by defining freedom as merely the absence of
external compulsion, not the freedom to choose otherwise than one does.
That is, human free will and divine determinism are compatible if free will
means that one’s will is not externally compelled but is nevertheless determined
by the unilaterally efficacious divine will. Compatibilists frequently appeal to
passages such as Gen 50:20, where Joseph states of his brothers’ evil in selling
him into slavery, “you meant evil against me, but God meant it for good
in order to bring about this present result, to preserve many people alive.”
Likewise, compatibilists point to Phil 2:12-13, which states, “work out your
salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God who is at work in you, both to
will and to work for His good pleasure.” In these texts (and others like them),
the compatibilist claims that the free will of humans (secondary causation)
acts in subordination to God’s overarching determinism (primary causation).
Conversely, the indeterminist maintains that these texts (and others like them)
do not support compatibilism but merely assert that God’s providential
actions, which do not preclude the libertarian freedom of humans, can
bring good out of evil (Gen 50:20) and work out the salvation of those who
respond positively to his free gift (Phil 2:12-13).6
Biblical citations are from the NASB unless otherwise noted.
Indeed, the compatibilist perspective on Gen 50:20 raises the question as to
why God doesn’t just directly overrule the famine. Why take the circuitous route of
determining that Joseph be sold into slavery to meet the problem of the famine when
God could simply remove the famine unilaterally? It appears that some other factor
or factors were operative.
5
6
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This brings the debate between the compatibilist and the advocate of
significant freedom to an apparent impasse. Both claim that their arguments
are based on Scriptural passages that negate the perspective of the other.
However, it seems to me that the discussion might remain on the basis of a
canonical approach to theological method and yet be advanced by approaching
the issue from a theocentric perspective.7 That is, rather than focusing on
human freedom qua human freedom, the discussion might be advanced by
focusing on the logically prior question, is God’s will always efficacious? That
is, does God always get what he wants?8
God Does Not Always Get What He Wants
An abundance of biblical evidence suggests that God does not always get
what he wants. That is, there are some things that God wills that do not
come to fruition. Scripture displays a number of instances where God’s will
is unfulfilled because creatures reject or resist that which God desires.9 For
instance, Isaiah speaks of God’s desire to save his people, saying that he
“longs [hkx] to be gracious” to them and “waits on high to have compassion,”
but they were “not willing” (hba; Isa 30:15, 18).10 Likewise, God “called, but
no one answer[ed],” and he “spoke, but they did not listen. And they did
evil in [his] sight and chose that in which [he] did not delight” (Isa 66:4; cf.
65:12; Jer 19:5). In these instances, God desires to redeem his people but they
themselves reject his will for them. The rejection of God’s will by humans
is also explicit in Luke 7:30, which states that “the Pharisees and the lawyers
rejected God’s purpose [boulh,] for themselves” (cf. Mark 7:24).11 Further,
The canonical approach I have in mind here gives methodological priority to the
canonical data. See John C. Peckham, “The Analogy of Scripture Revisited: A Final
Form Canonical Approach to Systematic Theology,” Mid-America Journal of Theology
22 (2011), 41-53.
7

8
Here and throughout the article, to “want” refers to the desire or wish for some
outcome (without connoting need), and that which God wants (or desires) is defined
as that which God would bring about if he were to unilaterally and causally determine
the outcome.
9
Of course, a full discussion of the divine will is far beyond the scope of this essay.
For further information on the canonical data regarding the divine will, particularly
with regard to divine unfulfilled desires and human freedom, see the extensive survey
in John C. Peckham, The Concept of Divine Love in the Context of the God-World Relationship
(New York: Peter Lang), forthcoming. See also the discussion in John C. Peckham,
“Providence and God’s Unfulfilled Desires,” Philosophia Christi 15/2 (2013), 453-462.
10
That God “waits” (hkx) on the people suggests that God makes his action(s)
dependent upon contingencies.
11
As Joseph Fitzmyer comments, “the Pharisees and lawyers thwarted God’s
design on their behalf.” Luke I-IX, vol. 28 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1981). 670.
Cf. Joel B. Green, The Gospel of Luke, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997),
301; Darrell L. Bock, Luke 1:1-9:50, BECNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1994), 678. H.
J. Ritz adds that this assumes “that the βουλη of God can be hindered.” “boulh,” in
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Jesus frequently refers to those who do “the will” [qe,lhma] of the Father
with the implication that God’s will is not always done (Matt 7:21; 12:50;
18:14; Mark 3:35; John 6:40; cf. Matt 6:10; John 7:17; 9:31).12
Various Christological examples parallel the wider examples of God’s
unfulfilled desires.13 For example, Jesus’s will is explicitly thwarted or rejected
when Jesus wanted (qe,lw) no one to know of his location but “he could
not escape notice” (Mark 7:24; cf. Luke 12:49).14 Further, Jesus poignantly
laments, “Jerusalem, Jerusalem, who kills the prophets and stones those who
are sent to her! How often I wanted [qe,lw] to gather your children together,
the way a hen gathers her chicks under her wings, and you were unwilling
[qe,lw]” (Matt 23:37; cf. Luke 13:34; John 5:40).15 Notice that, by the same
verb (qe,lw), Christ’s will is directly opposed by the will of humans.
In many other instances, God’s will is unfulfilled. God does not desire
or have “pleasure” [#px] in the death of the wicked but desires repentance
(Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11). However, many reject him.16 Therefore, God’s will
Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Horst Robert Balz and Gerhard Schneider
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 224. Piper, however, claims that “themselves” does
not modify “God’s purpose” but modifies “rejected” such that “Luke would be saying
that the plan of salvation preached by John the Baptist was accepted by some and
rejected by others ‘for themselves.’” Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 119, no.
26. However, this interpretation is not convincing.
12
See R. T. France, The Gospel of Matthew, NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2007), 246. Cf. John Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2005), 288. Cf. Matt 21:31; Luke 12:47; 1 John 3:22. Marshall comments,
“It is as we freely yield ourselves to God that he is able to accomplish his will through
us and our prayers. In a very real sense, therefore, the accomplishment of God’s will
in the world does depend on our prayers.” I. Howard Marshall, The Epistles of John,
NICNT (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 245.
13
The relevance of such instances from the life of Christ to the present study
depends upon the Christological perspective that one takes regarding the nature of
the will of the person of Christ, an adequate treatment of which is far beyond the
scope of this essay. Suffice it to say here that I consider the texts referenced here to
be relevant examples on the affirmation of the full divinity and full humanity of the
single person of Christ, on the basis of which I resist the tendency to assign particular
actions of Christ to either his divine or human nature. Yet, those who question whether
these might be properly taken as examples of the divine will might nevertheless see
them as (minimally) relevant in that they parallel the earlier and later examples of
divine unfulfilled desires.
14
See Robert H. Stein, Luke, NAC (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2001), 364.
Cf. C.F.D. Moule, An Idiom Book of New Testament Greek, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, United
Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 137, 87; I. Howard Marshall, The Gospel
of Luke, NIGTC (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1978), 546.
15
Human wills explicitly rejected the will of Jesus. See France, The Gospel of
Matthew, 883; Nolland, The Gospel of Matthew, 951.
16
Although God has no pleasure in anyone’s death, “Yahweh will not impose his
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is not unilaterally efficacious; some factor or factors bring about states of
affairs contrary to God’s will that cause him grief and bring him to judgment,
though he “does not afflict willingly” (Lam 3:33; cf. 2 Chron 36:16). Indeed,
God is profoundly troubled at the thought of bringing judgment against his
people. Thus, he declares over his wayward people, “How can I give you up,
O Ephraim? How can I surrender you, O Israel? How can I make you like
Admah? How can I treat you like Zeboiim? My heart is turned over within
Me, All My compassions are kindled” (Hos 11:8). However, finally God gives
people over to their own choices (cf. Rom 1:24). God states that he called his
people, “but My people did not listen to My voice, And Israel did not obey
Me. So I gave them over to the stubbornness of their heart to walk in their
own devices. Oh that My people would listen to Me, that Israel would walk
in My ways! I would quickly subdue their enemies and turn My hand against
their adversaries” (Ps 81:11-14). If God unilaterally determines the wills of
all creatures, how can one make sense of such statements? Why would God
lament and long for his people to “listen” to him when he is the one who has
unilaterally determined that they would not listen to him?
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, numerous biblical texts assert
God’s desire that every person be saved. For example, God “desires [qe,lw]
all men to be saved” (1 Tim 2:4).17 Yet, the NT elsewhere demonstrates that
the divine desire that all be saved is not actualized (cf. 1 John 2:17; Heb 10:36).
Likewise, God “is patient [makroqume,w] . . . not wishing [bou,lomai] for
any to perish but for all to come to repentance” (2 Pet 3:9). However, not all
repent (cf. Rev 2:21; 9:20-21; 16:9, 11) and divine patience itself presumes the
possibility of unfulfilled desire (cf. 2 Pet 3:15). It is sometimes argued that the
terms anyone and all in such passages may be referring to all kinds of people
rather than every single individual or that such terms may simply be referring
to the specific addressees of the letter.18 However, such interpretations seem
strained, especially in light of other texts that do not leave room for that kind
of interpretation, such as Ezek 18:32, where God states, “I have no pleasure
in the death of anyone who dies. . . . Therefore, repent and live” (emphasis
grace on a rebellious people. They must accept responsibility for both the course of
their lives and their destiny. Without repentance God cannot forgive and the death
sentence remains inevitable.” Daniel I. Block, The Book of Ezekiel: Chapters 1–24
(NICOT; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1997), 589.
17
Anton Vögtle contends that this verse excludes the Calvinist/Determinist
perspective. Der Judasbrief, der 2. Petrusbrief, EKK (Düsseldorf: Benziger Verlag, 1994),
231-232. Cf. D. Müller, “qelw,” NIDNTT 3: 1020. Further, a number of exhortations
to prove, understand, and do the will of God imply that humans may will otherwise
than they do (Rom 12:2; Eph 5:17; Eph 6:6; cf. Col 1:9; 4:12; 1 Thess 4:3; 5:18; cf.
Phlm 14). While such exhortations are not positive examples of God’s unfulfilled will,
such exhortations would be superfluous if God’s will were always carried out.
18
Cf. Richard J. Bauckham, 2 Peter, Jude, WBC (Dallas: Word, 2002), 313; Douglas
J. Moo, 2 Peter and Jude, NIV application commentary (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan,
1996), 188.
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mine).19 God does indeed desire the salvation of every individual, yet some
are lost.
The biblical data thus demonstrate that God’s will is sometimes
unfulfilled. The question, then, is why God’s desires sometimes go unfulfilled.
That is, why does God sometimes not get what he wants? As explained below,
an appeal to compatibilism does not adequately explain these texts, because if
God unilaterally determines all events, he should be able to bring to fruition
everything that he desires without anything that he does not desire. The
existence of unfulfilled divine desires does not make sense from a determinist
perspective but is perfectly coherent from an indeterminist perspective.
God’s Ideal and Effective Wills
Because God is omnipotent, that some of his desires do not come to pass
suggests a distinction between two kinds of divine wills: ideal and effective.20
God’s ideal will refers to that which would take place if all agents acted in
perfect accordance with God’s desires, whereas God’s effective will refers to
God’s will that has already taken into account all factors, including the wills

19
Many indeterminist interpreters agree. Thus, Davids states that God wants
“‘everyone’/‘all’ to come to repentance. . . . God’s will may not be done, but it will not
be for lack of trying on his part.” Peter H. Davids, The Letters of 2 Peter and Jude, PNTC
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 281. Similarly, Eric Fuchs and Pierre Reymond
believe this text argues against determinism. La deuxième Épitre de Saint Pierre. L’épitre de
Saint Jude, Commentaire du Nouveau Testament (Neuchâtel, Switzerland: Delachaux
& Niestlé, 1980), 115-116. Likewise, some of the foremost determinist interpreters
believe 1 Tim 2:4 and others describe God’s genuine desire for the salvation of all. See
Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 108; Thomas R. Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, NAC
(Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 2007), 382.
20
Many others have also recognized some distinction in the will or wills of God.
For example, I. Howard Marshall states, “We must certainly distinguish between what
God would like to see happen and what he actually does will to happen, and both of
these things can be spoken of as God’s will.” I. Howard Marshall, “Universal Grace
and Atonement in the Pastoral Epistles,” in The Grace of God, the Will of Man: A Case
for Arminianism, ed. Clark H. Pinnock (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1995), 56.
Consider also Kenneth Keathley’s summary of the four primary positions on God’s
will, specifically as it relates to God’s desire to save all or the lack thereof. Two major
perspectives—universalism and decretal theology—view God’s will as simple. The
former view contends that God desires to save all and does so, whereas the latter
contends that God desires to save only some. The other two major perspectives—
the hidden/revealed wills paradigm and the antecedent/consequent wills paradigm—
view God’s will as complex. The former is represented by Schreiner and Piper in this
essay, whereas my view corresponds more closely to the latter paradigm. Kenneth
Keathley, Salvation and Sovereignty: A Molinist Approach (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic,
2010), 44-62.
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of significantly free creatures.21 As such, it includes not only the active divine
will but also that which God merely allows (his permissive will).
For example, although God’s ideal desire was that Adam and Eve
not disobey him and eat the forbidden fruit, God also desired the kind of
reciprocal divine-human love relationship that is predicated on the significant
freedom of both parties. Therefore, God permitted Adam and Eve to depart
from his ideal will in favor of allowing significant freedom. To take another
example, God did not sadistically delight in, or ideally desire, the crucifixion
of Christ (cf. Lam 3:32–33). Rather, it was his “pleasure” only in the wider
context of the plan of salvation. That is, because of his love for his creatures,
and because the death of his Son was the means of their redemption, God
was “pleased to crush Him” (cf. Isa 53:10). Ideally, however, there would have
never been sin and thus no occasion for such suffering and sacrifice. As such,
when God is said to pleasure in things that are themselves distasteful to him,
God’s pleasure is in the wider result rather than the things themselves (cf. Isa
53:10; Matt 11:25–26; Luke 10:21).22 In this manner, such passages do not
contradict the clear meaning of passages that state that God has no pleasure
in the death of anyone (cf. Ezek. 18:23, 32; 33:11).
This distinction between that which God ideally desires (ideal will)
and that which often actually takes place (effective will) is supported by the
primary word groups of God’s will in both the OT (#px) and NT (qe,lw
and bou,lomai). In some instances these terms refer to God’s unfulfilled will
In other words, it is that which God wills in accordance with the wider matrix
of creaturely freedom. This distinction is similar to the Arminian distinction between
antecedent and consequent wills. I have elected not to use these terms, to avoid any
unintended connotations of ontology, especially with regard to the operation of the
divine will as it relates to providence (specifically the theoretical order of the divine
decrees). For a discussion of Arminius’ view of the antecedent and consequent wills
of God and their implications for divine sovereignty, see Roger E. Olson, Arminian
Theology: Myths and Realities (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2006), 23. See also
Alvin Plantinga’s distinction between strong and weak actualization in his argument for
the significant freedom of creatures and divine omnipotence and omnibenevolence.
Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 172-173. Cf. Peckham, “Providence and God’s
Unfulfilled Desires.”
22
God’s permissive will (as a subset of God’s effective will) thus may function
in accordance with wide principles of the extent of freedom afforded to creaturely
agents. However, it is well beyond the scope of this work to delve more deeply into
this issue of divine providence. Consider, for a brief overview of these issues of
divine providence, Fernando Canale, “Doctrine of God,” in Handbook of Seventh-day
Adventist Theology, ed. Raoul Dederen (Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000),
118-120; Thomas P. Flint, “Divine Providence,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical
Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (New York: Oxford University Press,
2008), 262-285. Cf. Francesca Aran Murphy and Philip Gordon Ziegler, eds., Providence
of God (New York: T&T Clark, 2009); Dennis Jowers, ed. Four Views on Divine Providence
(Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011); Peckham, “Providence and God’s Unfulfilled
Desires.”
21
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and/or desires (Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11; Isa 65:12; 66:4; Prov 21:3; Matt 22:37;
Mark 7:24; Luke 7:30; 1 Tim 2:4; 2 Pet 3:9), whereas elsewhere the terms
may refer to God’s effective will rather than his ideal will (cf. Isa 46:10; 53:10;
Acts 2:23; 1 Cor 4:19; James 4:15).23 Thus, whereas theologians continue to
debate the operation of the divine will, the biblical data demonstrate that
there is nothing inherent in the terminology of will that requires or suggests
unilateral efficaciousness.24 In fact, as seen above, the biblical data show that,
since many things occur that God does not want to occur, the divine will
may be unfulfilled. The distinction between God’s ideal and effective wills,
then, corresponds to the data of Scripture and provides a compelling and
internally coherent explanation for the texts that depict God’s unfulfilled
wishes, especially regarding God’s actual desire to save everyone, which does
not come to fruition despite God’s genuine efforts (e.g., Isa 5:1-7).
The Determinist Conception of God’s Two Wills
If God does not always get what he wants, it appears that one must reject
determinism. However, some determinists have proposed a nuanced
explanation that deserves careful consideration. John Piper and Tom
Schreiner—two of the most influential determinist thinkers today—both
agree that texts such as 1 Tim 2:4 (God “desires [qe,lw] all men to be saved”)
23
In the OT, the term #px may refer to God’s desire and/or will, at times fulfilled
and at times unfulfilled, but also may denote God’s delight and/or pleasure. See
G. Johannes Botterweck, “#px” TDOT 13:92; Leon J. Wood, “#px” TLOT 1:310;
David Talley, “#px,” NIDOTTE 2:232. In the NT, the qe,lw word group relates to
that which is willed, desired, wanted, taken pleasure in, or even liked. See Müller,
NIDNTT 3:1018; M. Limbeck, “qelw” in Exegetical Dictionary of the New Testament,
ed. Horst Robert Balz and Gerhard Schneider (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1990),
138; “qe,lw” in Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament Based on Semantic Domains, ed.
Johannes P. Louw and Eugene Albert Nida (New York: United Bible Societies, 1996),
287, 300. The βουλομαι word group similarly relates to that which is wanted, desired,
willed, intended, and/or planned, whether of volition or inclination, often with the
connotation of deliberation. See D. Müller, “boulomai,” NIDNTT 3: 1015-1017;
Gottlob Schrenk, “boulomai, boulh, boulhma,” in TDNT, ed. Gerhard Kittel,
Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
1964), 632. Even rxb, the primary term of election in the OT, may refer to God’s
unfulfilled desire (Prov 21:3 cf. Isa 58:5-6; Matt 9:13; Heb 10:5, 8; 13:21). See the
extended discussion of these various terms and the import of their canonical usage in
Peckham, The Concept of Divine Love in the Context of the God-World Relationship.
24
I. Howard Marshall thus correctly comments that assuming that God’s will is
always done in “deterministic terms is inconsistent with the freedom which the Bible
itself assigns to God’s children.” Marshall, The Epistles of John, 245. This is contra the
sometimes misleading statements regarding these terms such as the contention that the
use of the boulomai word-group “is always a case of an irrefragable determination.”
Müller, NIDNTT 3:1017. Cf. Gottlob Schrenk, “qelw, qelhma, qelhsij,” in TDNT,
ed. Gerhard Kittel, Geoffrey William Bromiley, and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids,
Mich, MI: Eerdmans, 1964), 3:47. Cf. Luke 7:30.
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refer to God’s genuine desire that all will be saved, while both nevertheless
maintain the idea of double predestination.25 To coherently maintain God’s
genuine desire that all be saved and double predestination, both Piper
and Schreiner recognize a distinction between two divine wills. Schreiner
distinguishes between God’s “decretive will” and his “desired will,” such that
“God genuinely desires in one sense that all will be saved” and yet “he has
not ultimately decreed that all will be saved.”26 As Piper puts it, “God chooses
for behavior to come about that he commands not to happen” such that
God’s desires are “complex” and one may distinguish between God’s “will of
command” and his “will of decree.”27
Piper points to a number of examples to support the complexity of
the divine will. For instance, he claims that in the Exodus account, “there
is a sense in which God does will that Pharaoh go on refusing to let the
people go” (will of decree) and “there is a sense in which he does will that
As Thomas Schreiner (himself a determinist) puts it, “By extension we should
understand 2 Pet 3:9 in the same way as Ezek 18:32. It refers to God’s desire that
everyone without exception be saved.” Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, 382. He adds that,
in Ezek 18:32, “God’s regret over the perishing of anyone is clear.” Ibid., 381. Piper
notes that it is possible that 1 Tim 2:4 does not refer to God’s desire to save all but
personally believes that it is the most likely interpretation, especially in light of Ezek
18:23, 18:32, and 33:11, and thus states that “as a hearty believer in unconditional,
individual election I rejoice to affirm that God does not delight in the perishing of
the impenitent, and that he has compassion on all people. My aim is to show that
this is not double talk.” Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 108. He further states,
“I affirm with John 3:16 and 1 Timothy 2:4 that God loves the world with a deep
compassion and desires the salvation of all men. Yet I also affirm that God has chosen
from the foundation of the world whom he will save from sin” (ibid., 130). However,
Piper contends of 1 Tim 2:4, “When free will is found in this verse, it is philosophical,
metaphysical assumption, not an exegetical conclusion” (ibid., 124).
25

Schreiner, 1, 2 Peter, Jude, 381-382. Elsewhere, he states, “God desires the
salvation of all in one sense, but he does not ultimately ordain that all will be saved.”
Ibid., 381. In his view, “the Scriptures, if accepted as a harmonious whole, compel
us to make such distinctions.” Ibid., 382. This solution complements the traditional
Reformed distinction between God’s hidden and revealed wills, but with considerable
nuance. See John Calvin, Commentaries on the Catholic Epistles (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 1948), 419-420; Martin Luther, The Bondage of the Will, trans. O.R. Johnston
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 2003), 101. See also, in this regard, Paul Kjoss
Helseth’s treatment in “God Causes All Things,” in Four Views on Divine Providence, ed.
Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 25-52, 165-169.
26

27
Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 114, 118. As Piper describes, “When
God looks at a painful or wicked event through his narrow lens, he sees the tragedy
or the sin for what it is in itself and he is angered and grieved” (ibid., 126). Cf. Ezek
18:32. “But when God looks at a painful or wicked event through his wide-angle lens,
he sees the tragedy or the sin in relation to all the connections and effect that form a
pattern or mosaic stretching into eternity. This mosaic, with all its (good and evil) parts
he does delight in (Ps. 115:3)” (ibid).
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Pharaoh release his people” as he commands (will of command).28 Likewise,
Piper explains that while Judas’s betrayal of Jesus was “inspired immediately
by Satan (Luke 22:3)” the Bible also declares that “Jesus [was] delivered up
according to the definite plan (boule) and foreknowledge of God” (Acts
2:23).29 For Piper, this is the “most compelling example of God’s willing for
sin to come to pass while at the same time disapproving the sin.”30 Yet, Piper
explains, “in ordering all things, including sinful acts, God is not sinning,”
because “God can will that a sinful act come to pass without willing it as
an act of sin himself.”31 Finally, Piper contrasts God’s “desire” (#px) to kill
Eli’s sons (1 Sam 2:25; cf. Deut 28:63) with the statements that God takes
no pleasure in (#px) the death of the wicked (Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11).32 Thus,
“in one sense God may desire the death of the wicked and in another sense
he may not.”33 Thus, both Piper and Schreiner agree that God’s desires are
complex and some do not come to fruition, especially with regard to his
desire to save all. However, all of this evokes the question, Why would God’s
will be complex?34
28
Ibid., 114. As Piper puts it, “The good thing that God commands he prevents.
And the thing he brings about involves sin” (ibid). Significantly, however, according to
the ordering of the texts in Exodus, Pharaoh hardened his own heart (Exod 8:15, 32)
before God hardened it. Piper, to his credit, recognizes that the text does not explicitly
say that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart until the sixth plague (Exod 9:12; 10:20, 27;
11:10; 14:4). However, he contends that even if “God was not willing for Pharaoh’s
heart to be hardened during the first five plagues . . . for the last five plagues God
does will this” and that God’s action in this regard amounts to his willing of Pharaoh’s
self-proclaimed “sin” (Exod 10:17). Ibid. Cf. Deut 2:26-27, 30; Josh 11:19-20; Rom
11:25-26, 31-32.
29
Likewise, Piper points to examples in Mark where Christ wills that sinners “turn
and be forgiven (Mark 1:15), but he acts in a way to restrict the fulfillment of that
will” by speaking in parables such that they may see but not perceive and hear but not
understand (cf. Mark 4:11-12). Ibid., 115. Further, he contends, God “wills a condition
(hardness of heart)” in Rom 11:25-26 “that he commands people to strive against
(‘Do not harden your heart’ [Heb 3:8, 15; 4:7]).” Ibid., 116.
30
Ibid., 111.
31
Ibid., 122-123. Cf. Jas 1:13.
32
In fact, he emphasizes that God is said to act the way he does “because” of his
desire to put them to death. Ibid., 117.
33
Ibid. He claims that again “we are faced with the inescapable biblical fact that
in some sense God does not delight in the death of the wicked (Ezek 18), and in
some sense he does (Deut 28:63; 2 Sam 2:25).” Ibid., 118-119. On the other hand, the
question is not whether God finally desired the death of Eli’s sons but why he desired
it. From an indeterminist perspective, God’s “desire” to put Eli’s sons to death was a
result of their freely willed and persistent wickedness.
34
It is important to note that each of the examples that Piper surveys in his
arguments in favor of his conception of two wills (above) can be accounted for by the
distinction between God’s ideal and effective wills.
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Why Are God’s Desires Sometimes Unfulfilled?
As Piper puts it, “what are we to say of the fact that God wills something
that in fact does not happen?”35 For instance, if God is omnipotent and
God wants everyone to be saved, as Piper and I agree that he is and does,
why isn’t everyone saved?36 In the determinist views of Piper and Schreiner
(among others), God in some sense desires that all be saved but nevertheless
decrees, solely on the basis of his unilaterally efficacious will, that some will
be damned. However, this raises an impenetrable difficulty: if God’s will is
unilaterally efficacious and God wants to save everyone, why does he not do
so? As Jerry Walls states, “If freedom and determinism are compatible, God
could have created a world in which all persons freely did only the good at all
times.”37 If—as the compatibilist view presumes—God unilaterally effects his
will, then God should determine “all to freely accept his love and be saved.”38
Piper answers that “God wills not to save all, even though he is willing
to save all, because there is something else that he wills more, which would be
lost if he exerted his sovereign power to save all.”39 That is, “God is committed
to something even more valuable than saving all,” a “higher commitment.”40
Thus, “God’s will to save all people is restrained by his commitment to the
glorification of his sovereign grace (Eph 1:6, 12, 14; Rom 9:22-23).”41 I
agree with Piper’s appeal to God’s higher commitment. However, the crucial
question is what that higher commitment is.

Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 123.
The omnipotence of God rules out the view that some power greater than God
is overruling what he wills: “Neither Calvinist nor Arminian affirms this.” Ibid.
37
Jerry L. Walls, “Why No Classical Theist, Let Alone Orthodox Christian,
Should Ever Be a Compatibilist,” Philosophia Christi 13, no. 1 (2011): 82.
38
Ibid., 96. “To put the point most bluntly, if compatibilism is true, it is all
but impossible, in the actual world, to maintain the perfect goodness of God, and
altogether impossible to do so if orthodox Christianity is true.” Ibid., 80. Walls and
David Baggett contend that the compatibilistic account relies on euphemistic and
evasive language, stating “it’s only the elect who can actually receive salvation, so no
offer of salvation to the non-elect is a genuine offer. . . . To describe such an empty
offer as a genuine one is worse than euphemistic.” See the discussion in Good God:
The Theistic Foundations of Morality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 72. Cf.
the discussion in ibid., 67-73. David Bentley Hart adds, in this regard, that “freedom
lies not in an action’s logical conditions, but in the action itself; and if an action is
causally necessitated or infallibly predetermined, its indeterminacy with regard to its
proximate cause in no way makes it free.” “Impassibility as Transcendence: On the
Infinite Innocence of God,” in Divine Impassibility and the Mystery of Human Suffering, ed.
James Keating and Thomas Joseph White (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 309.
39
Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 123.
40
Ibid., 124, 130.
41
Ibid., 130.
35
36
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In my view, God’s highest value is love, which is itself essential to his
character and requires justice.42 Since freedom is a prerequisite of love, God
cannot unilaterally determine that creatures love him or one another.43 Thus,
though he never desires evil to occur, God allows humans the freedom to
choose evil, including the human decision to reject salvation, because to
exclude freedom would be to exclude love, which would run counter to God’s
own character, since “God is love” (1 John 4:8, 16).44 Notice that, in this view,
God’s higher commitment to love is one that he cannot bring about without
allowing freedom and, thus, the possibility of evil. God, in accordance with
his universal love, wanted to save those who are finally lost but they are not
willing (cf. Isa 66:4; Ezek 3:7; Matt 23:37; Luke 13:34).
For Piper’s Calvinistic determinism, on the other hand, “the greater value
is the manifestation of the full range of God’s glory in wrath and mercy (Rom
9:22-23) and the humbling of man so that he enjoys giving all credit to God for
his salvation (1 Cor 1:29).”45 However, according to the logical conclusions of
Piper’s determinism, couldn’t God accomplish this without the possibility, or
reality, of evil? Could not God simply determine that all creatures recognize
his glory to the utmost? If God unilaterally determines everything, as Piper
and others suppose, then he could have willed the recognition “of the full
range” of his glory and grace immediately.
One wonders, in this regard, why God would want to manifest his “glory
in wrath,” especially when the Bible contends that he does not afflict willingly
nor desire that any perish (Lam 3:32-33; Ezek 18:32; 33:11; 2 Pet 3:9). Further,
I see no rationale, from a determinist perspective, for viewing God’s will as
I categorically reject the way Piper frames the indeterminist view of this
higher commitment. He states, “The answer given by Arminians is that human selfdetermination and the possible resulting love relationship with God are more valuable
than saving all people by sovereign, efficacious grace.” Ibid., 124. I am not concerned
about “human self-determination” in and of itself, but I do care about the character
of God as described by Scripture, and the significant freedom of humans provides the
key to understanding God’s character in light of the questions of theodicy.
43
Many theologians, like Vincent Brümmer, believe that “love is necessarily free.”
The Model of Love: A Study in Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993), 177. Likewise numerous exegetes contend that “coerced love is not love.”
See James D. G. Dunn, Romans 1–8 (Dallas: Word, 2002), 481. Thus, “God never
imposes His love by overriding human will.” Craig Blomberg, Matthew (Nashville:
Broadman & Holman, 2001), 350. Of course, many question whether “love” actually
requires freedom since the nature of love is itself debated. This question far exceeds
the scope of this essay. See, in this regard, Peckham, The Concept of Divine Love in the
Context of the God-World Relationship.
44
Accordingly, the “fact that all are not saved can be attributed to the stubbornness
of the human will rather than to the weakness of the divine intent.” Thomas D. Lea
and Hayne P. Griffin, Jr., 1, 2 Timothy, Titus (NAC 34; Nashville: Broadman & Holman,
2001), 89. So Jerry L. Walls and Joseph Dongell, Why I Am Not a Calvinist; idem, “Why
No Classical Theist,” 98.
45
Piper, “Are There Two Wills in God?” 124.
42
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“restrained.” It seems to me that in Piper’s view there should be no such
restraint. God could bring it about that all recognize the fullness of his glory
without demonstrating it historically, since, for Piper, God can unilaterally
determine anything and no one can question his will.
Indeed, Piper’s view fails to account for why a sovereign God would
have complex desires at all, whereas the significant-freedom perspective
faces no difficulty in this regard. The problem with Piper’s view does not lie
with the concept of God’s commitment to a higher purpose, which results
in complex desires. I agree that God “wills” some things that he does not
ideally desire because of a greater purpose that he desires more (without ever
actually wanting any evil to occur). However, Piper’s view falters because it
maintains that God’s higher commitment requires all of the suffering and evil
in the world. Taking Piper’s view to its logical conclusion, it appears that God
willed and unilaterally determined all evil and suffering, even the sexual abuse
of children and the burning alive of infants to pagan gods, along with every
other single event of evil, because God wanted to demonstrate his glory, grace,
and wrath.46 Although God did not want children to suffer such abuse, he
wanted to demonstrate his glory, grace, and wrath more. However, why would
such things bring glory to God in the first place, even indirectly?47
In this regard, Thomas McCall presents an analogy wherein a father who
is able to fully control every desire and act of his seven children, commands
them not to play with matches, yet determines that they do so and thereby
set their playroom ablaze. He then bursts into the room and carries three of
them to safety. When asked why he does not also save the other four, the
father replies that “this tragic occurrence had been determined by him” and
“worked out in exact accordance with his plan.” He further reminds them that
he had told them not to play with matches and thus the other four get what
they deserve. He claims that he has compassion on their siblings but that “this
has happened so that everyone could see how smart he is” and “how merciful
he is” and “how just he is.” McCall concludes, “Surely the fact that such a man
is a monster is beyond dispute.”48
46
See Thomas McCall’s criticism of Piper in this regard that, on determinism,
every evil (such as a father’s murder of his 5-year old daughter) happens because “God
determines that they will occur exactly as they do.” “I Believe in Divine Sovereignty,”
Trinity Journal 29NS (2008): 209. On the other hand, Piper should be commended for
his pastoral concern in stating by way of response that “if my affirmation that God
wills that sin come to pass . . . or that God wills that people die of starvation (Jer
11:22), requires of someone that they believe in their hearts that God sins or that God
is evil, then I say to them, ‘Do not yet believe what I say. Your conscience forbids
it.’” John Piper, “I Believe in God’s Self-Sufficiency: A Response to Thomas McCall,”
Trinity Journal 29NS (2008): 234.
47
McCall further asks where the supposition that God must display his glory
comes from. It is not “demanded by any passage of Scripture.” “I Believe in Divine
Sovereignty,” 223.
48
Thomas H. McCall, “We Believe in Divine Sovereignty: A Rejoinder to John
Piper,” Trinity Journal 29NS(2008): 241-242. As William Lane Craig comments, “the
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Even if such a powerful analogy can be effectively answered, Piper’s
account faces further difficulty. Specifically, if God unilaterally determined
everything, he would not need evil things to occur to bring him glory in
the first place. He could will the full recognition of his glory immediately.
Moreover, even if one could provide a rationale for why a God who unilaterally
determines everything could not efficaciously will the full manifestation of his
glory immediately, if God needed to will evil to arrive at the manifestation of
his glory, then we must say that God needed all of the evil that has occurred
in order to glorify his goodness. As David Bentley Hart puts it, “If God
needs the supplement of evil to accomplish any good he intends” then “he is
dependent upon evil in an absolute sense.”49 This presents a massive problem
for the moral character of God and appears to contradict the deterministic
understanding of God’s sovereign, efficacious will.50
The free-will defense, on the other hand, agrees that God’s overarching
desire for the universal harmony of all beings in loving relationship trumps
his desire, in the short-term, to exclude all suffering and evil. However, this
deterministic view holds that even the movement of the human will is caused by God.
God moves people to choose evil, and they cannot do otherwise. God determines
their choices and makes them do wrong. If it is evil to make another person do wrong,
then in this view God not only is the cause of sin and evil, but he becomes evil
himself, which is absurd.” William Lane Craig, “Response to Helseth,” in Four Views
on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011), 61.
Moreover, “[i]t is deeply insulting to God to think that he would create beings that
are in every respect causally determined by him and then treat them as though they
were free agents, punishing them for the wrong actions he made them do or loving
them as though they were freely responding agents.” Ibid., 62. Cf. Jerry L. Walls, “Why
No Classical Theist,” 98; Stephen T. Davis, “Universalism, Hell, and the Fate of the
Ignorant,” Modern Theology 6/2 (1990): 190.
49
“Providence and Causality: On Divine Innocence,” in Providence of God, ed.
Francesca Murphy and Philip Ziegler (New York: T&T Clark, 2009), 49. See also
McCall’s similar criticism in “I Believe in Divine Sovereignty,” 216-219. McCall argues
that if evil is necessary for God’s maximal glory, then God “would be imperfect without
such evil,” and this “pretty clearly violates robust accounts of both divine holiness and
divine aseity” and, taken to its logical conclusions, makes God’s existent contingent
upon the actualization of this world. Ibid., 219-220. Further, Piper’s account leaves
one “wondering just why we should see sin and suffering as finally reprehensible.” If
evil is “that important for God” and his maximal glory, then “why should we detest
sin, death, and the devil?” Ibid., 217. See Piper’s response wherein he affirms divine
aseity, saying that “God was fully God with no deficiencies before he created the
world” and qualifies his earlier statements to say that God’s “‘maximal glorification’ is
essential to God” only “as he is acting in creation” such that “it does not contradict
God’s aseity to say that in the act of creation and redemption and judgment it is God’s
nature and glory and name to act freely in the display of grace and wrath.” Piper, “I
Believe in God’s Self-Sufficiency,” 229-230. Cf. Walter Schultz, “Jonathan Edwards’s
End of Creation: An Exposition and Defense,” JETS 49/2 (2006): 269.
50
On the moral goodness of God, see Baggett and Walls, Good God.
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perspective claims that this is the case only because there is no other way to
bring about his overarching purpose, and no other way exists precisely because
his overarching purpose of love requires significant creaturely freedom.51
That is, God could not have brought his ultimate purpose to fruition without
at least the possibility of such suffering and evil, because doing so would
have required eliminating significant creaturely freedom, which would itself
remove the possibility of genuine love that was the higher commitment in
the first place.52 However, the free-will defense does not require that any evil
and suffering actually take place in order to bring about God’s purpose. That
is, evil did not need to occur but occurred only because creatures exercised
their freedom negatively. It would have been better had Satan never fallen,
had Adam and Eve never sinned. Although God did not need evil to arise in
order to manifest his character, God is manifesting his character of perfect
love in dealing with evil once and for all, so that sin will never arise again and
his ultimate purpose of eternal, universal harmony of love will ultimately
come to fruition.
In all this, God calls for creatures to “judge” between himself and his
people: What more could God have done that he has not done? (Isa 5:34). The indeterminist perspective answers unequivocally that God has
done everything he could. He did not desire evil and he does not desire the
destruction of anyone. This brings us back to perhaps the most crucial point
regarding the validity of divine determinism: that God’s desires are not always
fulfilled is apparent in that God has no pleasure in the death of the wicked
(cf. Ezek 18:23, 32; 33:11) and desires that none would perish (2 Pet 3:9; cf.
1 Tim 2:4–6). However, not all people will be saved, because God eventually
gives people over to their desires (cf. John 3:18; Rom 1:24, 26, 28; 2:4–12;
1 John 2:17).53 While God truly desires the salvation of each individual and
works toward saving each one, some are lost because they reject God’s gift of
salvation through Jesus Christ (cf. John 3:18).
In contrast, the determinist view lacks a compelling answer to the
question, If God possesses the power to save everyone and wants to save
everyone, why does he not do so?54 Indeed, why is there any evil at all? The
51
As Gregory Boyd puts it, “God gave us the capacity freely to reject his loving
will because it was necessary for love” (emphasis his). “God Limits His Control,” in Four
Views on Divine Providence, ed. Dennis Jowers (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2011),
190. Cf. Brümmer, The Model of Love, 177.
52
As William Lane Craig puts it, “It is logically impossible to make someone freely
do something.” “The Coherence of Theism: Introduction,” in Philosophy of Religion:
A Reader and Guide, ed. William Lane Craig (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University
Press, 2002), 211.
53
For a compelling biblical argument against universalism, see I. Howard Marshall,
“The New Testament Does Not Teach Universal Salvation,” in Universal Salvation?
The Current Debate, ed. Robin Parry and Christopher Partridge (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2003), 55-76.
54
If, as Calvinists say, God deems it wise and good to elect unconditionally some
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appeal to God’s two wills fails to answer these questions, because it raises
another question; that is, why would a God who unilaterally determines
everything have two conflicting wills? That is, a God whose will does not take
into account the wills of others should not have complex desires because he
could unilaterally will that only good occur, never evil. As such, the existence
of unfulfilled divine desires throughout Scripture does not make sense from
a determinist perspective but is perfectly coherent within an indeterminist
perspective, based on the understanding of significant creaturely freedom.
Conclusion and Implications for the Free-Will Defense
In addressing the issue of whether a free-will defense can be adequately
supported by a biblical doctrine of significant creaturely freedom, two central
theocentric questions have been addressed. First, does God always get what
he wants? As seen above, the biblical data demonstrate that God’s will is
sometimes unfulfilled, which answers this question in the affirmative but
raises a second, equally important question, Why are God’s desires sometimes
unfulfilled? This article has demonstrated that determinism does not provide
an adequate response to these questions. The appeal to compatibilism does
not explain the biblical instances of God’s unfulfilled desires, since, if God
unilaterally determines all events, he possesses the ability to bring to fruition
only that which he desires. The appeal to God’s complex desires as a way to
address this issue does not suffice, because there appears to be no sufficient,
internally coherent reason for complex divine desires within a deterministic
worldview. From the standpoint of determinism, God ought to be able to
bring about his higher commitment and will only the good, never evil.
Determinism thus fails to provide an adequate explanation of the
numerous biblical texts that directly assert that God’s will is sometimes
unfulfilled. The determinist appeal to God’s two wills fails because it lacks a
compelling and coherent rationale for why God would have complex desires.
In the indeterminist view, on the other hand, the complexity of God’s will
arises because God has granted humans significant freedom that impacts the
course of history such that God’s ideal will may be unfulfilled and has done
so because love, which requires such freedom, would be excluded otherwise.
The indeterminist can thus present a coherent and biblically adequate
explanation of God’s unfulfilled desires, affirming that God never desires
evil, while maintaining the final triumph of God’s plan that will ultimately
bring everlasting harmony to the universe.
In all this, the biblical data regarding God’s unfulfilled desires point to the
authenticity of significant human freedom, which itself undergirds the freewill defense. God never does evil or desires evil of any kind but has allowed
creatures to have significant freedom because of his love. God’s preservation
of love exacted the highest price from God himself (John 3:16; 15:13). Christ
to salvation and not others, one may legitimately ask whether the offer of salvation
to all is genuine. Is it made with heart? Does it come from real compassion? Is the
willing that none perish a bona fide willing of love?” Piper, “Are There Two Wills in
God?” 127.
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willingly took the sins of the world on himself and, in doing so, has preserved
both his justice and his love (cf. Rom 3:23-26; Rom 5:8). To God alone be the
glory (soli deo gloria), because God is love!

